Share this story!            

Editorial: Strategy of talks in Khyber

The government is talking with the warlord of Khyber Agency through a jirga. The first reports are good. Mangal Bagh says he will abide by the writ of the state, which means the authority of the political agent will be restored, the militants will not brandish guns, and no local person in Bara will be fined or punished physically after being adjudged guilty by Mangal Bagh. Why this sudden level of submission to state authority? Why haven’t militants in other areas behaved the same way?

The answer is that the state was able to follow up its warnings with military challenge and show its willingness to fight the rebels. Once its military dominance was established, it was time to talk peace. In one way there is nothing new about the strategy followed by the army. Never talk to the enemy from a position of weakness. Always agree to “peace talks” when you have the upper hand. If you begin talking from a position of weakness you will end up making unilateral concessions.

The security forces went into Bara with credible numerical force. The militants thought it wise to melt away rather than fight. The forces took many prisoners, which was a wise decision because the prisoners were to become pawns in the “peace talks” that followed. Now Mangal Bagh is talking sense when he says he will not take the law into his own hands. However, from the broad smile he is shown displaying on TV it appears that he doesn’t believe that the state will stick it out in Khyber for long, and that he will be back to his shenanigans sooner than later. The verbal gimmick for this is: “Pakistan has not kept up its part of the deal.”

The biggest weakness of any military operation is its impermanence or its incompleteness. The one staged in Swat was incomplete and had very negative consequences. It should be noted that once an operation has been concluded in a slipshod manner the state loses its credibility in the same measure as the militants gain in theirs in the eyes of the victim population. People who are forced to live under the tyranny of the warlords first desire state intervention because they want their suffering to end. But when an operation to save them runs out of steam they develop a fear psychology that sees state action as “intervention” and “invasion”.

That is what has happened in South Waziristan and Swat. People there have suffered successful occupation by the warlords and unsuccessful “invasion” by the state, subjecting them to two-fold suffering. The concessions made in Swat have been questionable because they were made from a position of weakness. One reason why the ANP government in Peshawar has not impressed with its “peace talks” and “sharia” concessions is that the strength of the warlord Fazlullah has not undergone any visible diminution. What the state is trying to do is conceding a “parallel” authority in Swat that is only “morally” bound to let Peshawar live in peace. That will not do.

Unfortunately, this is exactly what the government wanted out of Mangal Bagh in the beginning. The man was allowed to rule Bara in return for “letting Peshawar alone”. Very soon it was proved that warlords cannot survive within a restricted space unless it is complete with its own economic sustenance. Now the next trouble spots are Hangu and Kohat, administered districts of the NWFP. The miscreants have laid siege to a police station and kidnapped officials in Hangu and want their men released. Needless to say, unless the government has the capacity to show muscle and attain a position of strength, talking “peace” with them will be a form of capitulation. *

Second Editorial: Al Qaeda, Turkey and Pakistan

The US consulate in Istanbul was attacked by three armed men on Wednesday. They killed three police guards on duty outside the building before being killed themselves by the security forces. A fourth attacker was wounded and has escaped.

In 2003, a terrorist group claimed responsibility for the bombings of the British consulate in Istanbul, the local headquarters of the HSBC bank, and two synagogues, which together left 58 dead, including the British consul general. The Turkish authorities maintain that the bombings are the work of a group with direct links to Al Qaeda.

The Turkish militant movement has recently become connected with the Pakistan-based Uzbek group located in Waziristan under the protection of Baitullah Mehsud. Originally called Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) under Qari Tahir Yuldashev, it is now renamed as Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).

The IJU has reached out to the Turks, and the appeal is quite simple: Turks and Uzbeks are related Turkic peoples and speak similar languages. The appeal has attracted expatriate Turks in Germany first. In March this year, a Turk named Cuneyt Ciftci, born and bred in Germany, went for suicide-bomber training to Waziristan and then blew himself up to kill American and Afghan troops in Paktika in Afghanistan.

A Turkish website hosted from Turkey appeals in the name of IJU. The targets are Turkey and Germany, the latter because Al Qaeda considers it the “weakest link” in the NATO operations in Afghanistan, whose “will” can presumably be broken through acts of terrorism. Germany has recently uncovered a terrorist group belonging to IJU in one of its small towns (Sauerland) planning to attack American targets in Germany. Those caught were Turks and German converts to Islam.

Al Qaeda is diversifying its core membership, and the IJU of Tahir Yuldashev is helping it recruit non-Arab “expatriate” nationalities like Turks, Kurds and Pakistanis, from the European Muslim diaspora. The problem facing Pakistan is that all these new recruits are taking training in our Tribal Areas. The Turkish Armed Forces Commander General, Yasar Buyukanit, called on our Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Tariq Majid, on Wednesday. These matters must have been discussed. Since both sides enjoy mutual confidence, they should tackle the problem jointly. *

Home | Editorial

Share this story!